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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
had concerned a less serious crime, or the method
of the invetigation had been more reprehensible,
then much could be said in favour of disregarding
the evidence which was a probable consequence of
the illegal proceeding. The likely result would
then have been to disregard all evidence obtained
after the unlawful behaviour of the police, because
in practice it was not possible to make a distinc-
tion.
I also believe that elastic rules should be appli-
cable to the taking of a deposition where the police
have failed to clarify the witness's right of exemp-
tion. It is hardly practical to lay down an either-or'
regulation.
VIII.
To sum up, in Norway it does not seem prac-
ticable to lay down an absolute rule in one direction
or the other concerning evidence obtained in an
unlawful manner, but the problem must be solved
according to the circumstances in each separate
case. Certain guiding principles for the decision
can be put forward:
The exclusion of evidence would be difficult to
support in the more excusable forms of illegality,
for instance, when there is an inadvertent breach
of rules or an overstepping of the bounds of legal
forms prescribed for obtaining evidence.
The exclusion of evidence would also be difficult
to support where there is a danger that the accused
would be likely to commit dangerous crimes if
allowed to go free. Generally speaking, there also
seems to be little reason to exclude evidence ob-
tained through the unlawful action of a private
individual. The same applies to evidence acquired
through an offence against a third party (and not
directly against the accused); however, in excep-
tional cases consideratioij for the third party may
require the exclusion of evidence.
There are strong reasons for excluding evidence
obtained through gross, deliberate, illegal action
against the accused, especially if this action has
been directed against his person in the form of
cruelty or other especially improper treatment.
But it may be assumed that in Norway such cases
will seldom occur in practice. One reason for this
is that the public prosecutor will be most hesitant
to offer evidence obtained by such a procedure.
One may conceive of an exception where the
dangerous character of the defendant speaks in
favour of conviction, but in such cases the argu-
ments for admission of the evidence would be very
strong.
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Arrest-Uniform Arrest Act-De Salvatore v.
State, 163 A.2d 244 (Del. 1960). Defendant was
convicted of drunken driving. On appeal, he con-
tended that the Uniform Arrest Act (in effect in
Delaware) is unconstitutional because it authorizes
detention for two hours on mere suspicion without
probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the Uniform Arrest Act is constitu-
tional, since the "reasonable ground to suspect"
required for detention under the Act is in context
equivalent to the "reasonable ground [or probable
cause] to believe" which is constitutionally re-
quired to support either detention, arrest without
warrant, or a complaint on which a search or arrest
warrant may be issued.
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Mapp v. Ohio,
29 U.S.L. WEEK 4798, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
Defendant was convicted of knowingly having in
her possession and control lewd and lascivious
books, pictures, and photographs. On appeal, she
contended that the statute under which she was
convicted violated her Fourteenth Amendment
rights against state action in derogation of free
thought and expression; she also contended that
although Ohio until now has been a "non-exclusion-
ary rule" state, the Fourteenth Amendment
should be construed to require exclusion in state
courts of evidence illegally seized by state officers,
and hence admission of such evidence at her trial
was a denial of due process. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, reversed and
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remanded, holding that contrary to interpreta-
tions of the federal exclusionary rule which con-
sidered it to be a judicial rule of evidence and as
such not applicable to the states (Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949)), the rule not only is an "essen-
tial ingredient" of the Fourth Amendment, and
thus constitutionally required of federal courts,
but also must be followed by state courts by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment, since "to hold
otherwise would be to grant the right but in reality
to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." The
- Court further held that the entire Fourth Amend-
ment, rather than its "core" as determined by the
"shocks-the-conscience" test, is applicable to the
states through the due process clause. Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred in the opinion of the Court but
emphasized as practical reasons for this decision
the inadequacy of alternative remedies and the
"working arrangement" travesty encouraged by
the federal-state "double standard" on exclusion
which existed prior to the present decision. Mr.
Justice Black also concurred, reasoning that the
Fourth Amendment in combination with the Fifth,
rather than the Fourth alone, constitutionally
compels adherence by all courts to the exclusionary
rule, citing Boyd 'v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). Mr. Justice Stewart concurred only in
result, not reaching the exclusionary rule issue de-
cided by the majority, but agreeing with defend-
ant's contention that the obscenity statute violated
her Fourteenth Amendment rights protecting free
thought and expression against state action.
Justices Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker dis-
sented, contending that since defendant's main
argument concerned the alleged unconstitution-
ality of the statute, five members of the Court had
"simply reached out to overrule Wolf"; that even
if the Fourth Amendment requires federal courts
to exclude evidence seized in violation of that
Amendment, the exclusionary rule is not neces-
sarily required of state courts by the Fourteenth
nAmendment; and that since within the require-
ments of due process the states are free to deter-
mine the specifics of trial procedure, the Court has
no right to impose the exclusionary rule on state
courts.
Arrest. Search and Seizure--Keiningham v.
United States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960). De-
fendants were convicted of violating gambling
laws. On appeal, they contended that the trial
court erred in denying their motion to suppress
evidence seized by officers pursuant to an illegal
entry. The Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that "breaking and entering" in-
cludes any entry without permission, whether with
or without force; that the officers, in entering
through an unlocked door, without proper announce-
ment, the house adjoining one for which they had
a valid search warrant, and to which they had been
admitted after making proper announcement, il-
legally entered that house, since the authority to
search was limited to the place described in the
warrant; and that since the entry was illegal, the
subsequent search" was invalid, and thus the trial
court should not have admitted the evidence that
defendants sought to suppress. The court indi-
cated, however, that proper announcement would
have rendered valid the entry and search without
a warrant.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-DiBella v. United
States, 284 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1960). Defendant's
pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence seized
in his apartment pursuant to his arrest by federal
narcotics agents was denied. On appeal, he con-
tended that since the complaint on which the war-
rant for his arrest was issued was based on personal
belief rather than probable cause for belief, it did
not support the warrant, and that consequently
neither his arrest nor the search made pursuant
thereto was valid. Although the Court of Appeals
agreed that the complaint was insufficient to sup-
port the warrant, it affirmed denial of defendant's
motion, holding that the arresting officers by vir-
tue of observations of defendant's activities,
though these were made six months prior to his
arrest, had reasonable grounds to believe that he
had violated federal narcotics laws, and thus could
validly arrest him without a warrant under federal
statute; and that since the arrest was lawful and
valid, narcotics seized in a reasonable search made
pursuant thereto were admissible as evidence.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Wong Sun v. United
States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961). See Confes-
sions, infra.
Attempt-People v. Anderson, 10 Cal. Rptr. 64
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See Larceny, infra.
Civil Rights Act-Monroe v. Pape, 81 Sup. Ct.
473 (1961). Dismissal of petitioner's complaint
against Chicago policf officers and City of Chicago
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for violation of Civil Rights Act, providing to in-
jured party civil remedy against any person who,
under color of state statute, ordinance, etc., sub-
jects him to deprivation of federally guaranteed
rights, privileges, or immunities, was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On
certiorari, petitioner contended that his com-
plaint-alleging that Chicago policemen, without
warrant for search or arrest, and under color of city
and state law, broke into and ransacked his home
in the early morning, that they took him to the
police station where he was questioned for ten
hours, that he was not taken before a magistrate
or permitted to call his family or attorney, and
that he was released without criminal charges
being preferred against him--stated a cause of
action under the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.
§1983). The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of
the complaint against the city, holding that a mu-
nicipal corporation was not a "person" within the
meaning of the Act, but reversed as to the officers,
holding that since individuals are protected against
unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, since "under color" of state law in-
cludes both action pursuant to state law and action
not pursuant thereto but made possible because
the wrongdoer is apparently clothed with authority
of state law, and since possibility of a remedy
under state law does not preclude action under
federal law, petitioner's complaint stated a cause
of action against the officers under the Civil Rights
Act. Justice Frankfurther dissented as to the re-
versal, holding that only acts authorized by state
law are covered by the Act, since injury due to
authorized acts cannot be remedied by state
courts.
Confessions-Coppola v. United States, 81 Sup.
Ct. 884 (1961). Defendant's conviction of bank
robbery was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. On certiorari, he contended
that although he was arrested solely by New York
officers, a "working arrangement" existed between
state and federal officers, and consequently state-
ments he made in a state jail, while being interro-
gated by federal officers during a period of deten-
tion illegal under both New York and federal
standards, were improperly admitted at the trial.
The Supreme Court, per curiam, affirmed, holding
that the facts of defendant's case were not within
the "working arrangement" rule of Anderson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1942). justice Douglas
dissented, stating that although defendant's arrest
and detention ostensibly were attributable only to
state officers, allowing admission of statements
made by defendant to federal officers during his
illegal detention undermines the McNabb-Mallory
exclusionary rule, since in substance though not
in form, the federal officers violated Federal Rule
5(a), which was designed to minimize secret inter-
rogation by federal officers, and thus the per curiam
decision permitted federal officers to "flout the
federal law so long as they let the accused stay in a
state jail."
Confessions-Rogers v. Richmond, 81 Sup. Ct.
735 (1961). After petitioner was convicted of mur-
der by a Massachusetts court, a federal district
court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas
corpus was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. On certiorari, petitioner con-
tended that since a confession which he did not
voluntarily make had been admitted in evidence,
his conviction was constitutionally invalid, and
consequently he was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus from a federal court. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, re-
versed and remanded, holding that since the trial
court determined the admissibility of defendant's
confession by use of a criterion of probable truth or
falsity, rather than that of "whether the behavior
of the state's law enforcement officials was such as
to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring
about confessions not freely self-determined"
without regard to truth or falsity, which is required
by due process of law, defendant was not constitu-
tionally tried and convicted; and that even though
his confession might not have been coerced, the
state court's determination of the issue of coercion
by unconstitutional standards automatically
rendered his conviction invalid, since the federal
court will not redetermine the issue by applying
the correct standard to the facts on the record be-
cause facts determined in the framework of erro-
neous legal standards cannot be expected to lead
to correct conclusions if and when a correct stand-
ard is later applied to them; and that an alterna-
tive procedure of allowing the federal district court
to conduct a hearing de novo on the issue of co-
ercion, available on habeas corpus proceeding but
not on direct review, will not be adopted since it
adequately protects neither the rights of defend-
ants nor those of the states. Justices Stewart and
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Clark dissented, stating that since the writ can be
granted only if defendant is in custody in violation
of the Federal Constitution, the question is whether
a confession was admitted which was in fact in-
voluntary. under Fourteenth Amendment stand-
ards, not whether the state court resolved the issue
by means of a constitutionally inadequate test.
Confessions-Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d
675 (D.C. Cir. 1960). After defendant's conviction
was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that his confession was obtained during illegal
detention prior to arraignment and before he was
informed of his rights, defendant was retried and
again convicted. On appeal, he contended that his
confession, originally inadmissible by the McNabb-
Mallory exclusionary rule, could not be validated
by any subsequent reaffirmation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that since the reason for
applying this exclusionary rule to defendant's
confession was removed when he was fully in-
formed of his rights, his reaffimed confession was
admissible if the reaffirmation was found by a jury
to have been voluntarily made.
Confessions-Wong Sun v. United Stales, 288
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961). Defendants were con-
victed of violating federal narcotics laws. On ap-
peal, they contended that confessions made inci-
dent to their illegal arrests, and evidence obtained
by virtue of information contained in pre-confes-
sion statements, were improperly admitted; and
that written statements prepared by an agent after
conversations with defendants were inadmissible
because defendants had not signed them. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although
the arrests were illegal, the confessions, if volun-
tary, were not rendered inadmissible because they
were obtained while defendants were under illegal
arrest; that so long as the pre-confession state-
ments were voluntary, they were not contaminated
by defendants' illegal arrests, and the officers could
use information they contained; and that since the
agent could have read the written statements in
evidence when called to testify about the conversa-
tions, defendants were not prejudiced by admis-
sion of the written statements themselves. Judge
Hamley dissented, stating that since the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine is intended to prevent
lawless conduct of law enforcement officers, it
should be applied to exclude information derived
from voluntary statements made while officers
were acting illegally, just as it has been applied to
exclude information resulting from physical ob-
jects so obtained.
Derivative Evidence-Wong Sun v. United
States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961). See Confes-
sions, supra.
Discovery-Jencks Act-Campbell v. United
States, 81 Sup.- Ct. 421 (1961). During the trial at
which they were subsequently convicted of bank
robbery, defendants' alternative motions to have
the court either order the Government to produce
pretrial statements of a Government witness (one
Staula) consisting of an interview report or strike
the witness' testimony were denied. On certiorari,
defendants contended that since the interview
report was a "statement" within the scope of the
Jencks Act, they were entitled to examine it for
impeachment purposes; and that since the Govern-
ment or the court was required to call as a witness
a Government agent whose testimony would bear.
on determination of whether the interview report
was a "statement," the trial court erred in ruling
that defendants must call the witness. The Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded for redetermi-
nation of defendants' motions, holding that since
defense counsel's cross-examination of Staula es-
tablished a prima facie case of defendants' right to.
examine the pretrial statement, inasmuch as the
agent's testimony might bring the interview report
within the Jencks Act, and since a litigant does
not have the burden of proving facts peculiarly
within the knowledge of his adversary, the court
or the Government was required to subpoena the
agent. The Court ordered the trial court to re-
affirm the conviction if a new inquiry conducted in
accordance with the above ruling results in denial
of the motions, or to grant a new trial if either of
the motions is granted. Justices Frankfurter,
Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented in part.
Discovery-People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881
(N.Y. 1961). Defendant was convicted of murder
in the first degree. On appeal, he contended that
the trial court committed reversible error in turn-
ing over to defense counsel for impeachment pur-
poses only such portions of prior statements made
by state's witnesses as the court held to be at vari-
ance with their direct testimony. Although the
Court of Appeals overruled its previous rule of
procedure, identical to that used by the court
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below, and substituted the Jencks Act rule, which
allows defense counsel to inspect in its entirety
each prior statement of a witness for the state
bearing on witness' direct testimony, the Court
affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that the
trial court's error was not prejudicial, and that
defendant's right to a fair trial was not denied,
since proof of guilt was overwhelming. While the
majority (in Judge Fuld's opinion of the Court)
agreed in the adoption of the Jencks Act rule, rea-
soning that defense counsel is in a better position
than is a trial judge to appraise the value of a
witness' pretrial statements for impeachment
purposes, three judges (in an opinion written by
Judge Froessel) concurred only in the result, de-
siring to retain the rule of procedure followed by
the trial court.
Discovery-Hackel v. Williams, 167 A.2d 364
(Vt. 1961). Plaintiff, a city grand juror, petitioned
for a writ of prohibition to prevent defendant, a
county court assistant judge, from taking, for use
in a criminal case, a deposition pursuant to an affi-
davit and application served on plaintiff by re-
spondent in the criminal case. Plaintiff alleged
that depositions for use in criminal cases can be
taken only to perpetuate testimony which might
otherwise be unavailable at the trial, and that the
deposition in question was intended solely to help
respondent "prepare his case." Defendant con-
tended that in addition to permitting the taking
of testimony in perpetuam, the applicable statute
permits the taking of depositions for the purpose
of aiding a respondent to "prepare his case," and
that the narrow construction ad-'ocated by plain-
tiff deprives a respondent of an opportunity equal
to the state's in obtaining sworn testimony. Hear-
ing the case on the pleadings, the Supreme Court
of Vermont issued the writ of prohibition, holding
that since the purpose of depositions in criminal
cases is to guard against failure of justice due to
loss of testimony by a defendant, such depositions
can be taken only to perpetuate testimony and not
to assist a defendant in "preparing his case"; that
since a defendant knows whether or not he is
guilty, while the state must decide whether or not
it should prosecute, a defendant's inability to ob-
tain depositions to help "prepare his case" does not
give the state an unfair advantage; and that allow-
ing defendants to have unlimited discovery would
tend to defeat sound judicial policy.
Double Jeopardy-Killilea v. United States, 287"
F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1961). Defendants were con-
victed of larceny of whiskey in interstate com-
merce. On appeal, they contended that since their
convictions resulted from a trial held subsequent
to a declaration of mistrial over their objection,
their rights against double jeopardy had been vio-
lated. Though it reversed on other grunds, the
Court of Appeals assumed for the sake of argument
that the conspiracy charge for which ddendants
were tried on the mistrial was so dosdy reated to
the substantive offense of which they were con-
victed that if they could not be retried on the
former, neither could they be on the latter, and
held that since circumstances concerning
communications to the jury justified the comt's
declaration of a mistrial even over defendint' ob-
jections, their contention that the court's purpme
was to subject them "to a second prosecution by
discontinuing the trial when it appears that the
jury might not convict" was without merit; that
the "ordeal, harassment, anxiety and insecurity"
to which defendants were subjected during the
eleven days of the first trial, and which the double
jeopardy provision was intended to prevent, were
far outweighed by the prospect of a miscarriage of
justice unfavorable to defendants which might well
have resulted from the first trial; and that conse-
quently the mistrial and second trial did not sub-
ject defendants to double jeopardy in violation of
their Fifth Amendment rights.
Double Jeopardy--CommonweaU v. Burke,
172 N.E.2d 605 (Mass. 1961). Defendant was found
not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of
manslaughter on an indictment expressly charging
both offenses. After the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the trial court had committed reversi-
4
ble error regarding admission of certain evidence,
defendant filed a plea in bar, in which he pleaded
autrefois acquit to the charge of second-degree
murder, and moved that he could be prosecuted
only on the charge of manslaughter and/or assault
and battery. On a Superior Court judge's report of
the plea to the Supreme Court for decision, de-
fendant contended that Massachusetts' statutory
provision against double jeopardy prohibited the
state from prosecuting him for second-degree
murder. The Supreme Court sustained defendant's
plea in bar, holding that where separate offenses
are expressly charged in a single indictment, the
effect is the same as if they had been set forth in
separate counts, and the verdicts must be dealt
with separately; that regardless of the outcome of
[Vol 52
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the manslaughter charge, the acquittal of the
murder charge is a final adjudication thereof; and
that since an unrecorded verdict has no effect,
defendant is statutorily entitled to have his verdict
of acquittal validated by recording.
Drunken Driving-Lee v. State Highway Comm'n.
Motor Vehicle Dep't, 358 P.2d 765 (Kan. 1961). See
Police Power, infra.
Entrapment-Rittenour v. District of Columbia,
163 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of commiting a lewd, obscene, or indecent
act in the District of Columbia. On appeal, he con-
tended that in order to confirm the suspicion that
defendant was a homosexual, the arresting officer
led defendant to believe that he would acquiesce in
defendant's homosexual advances. The Municipal
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when the
officer led defendant to believe he would consent
in order to encourage him to commit a lewd,
obscene, or indecent act, defendant was entrapped,
and his conviction for having committed such act
cannot stand; and that the statute does not apply
to an act committed in privacy in the presence of
a single, consenting person. The Court further
held that, in substance, defendant was convicted
of being a homosexual, which in itself violates no
District of Columbia law.
Entrapment-People v. Strong, 172 N.E.2d 765
(III. 1961). Defendant was convicted of selling,
dispensing, and possessing heroin. On appeal, he
contended that since a government employee sup-
plied him with the heroin, he had been entrapped.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that de-
fendant had been entrapped, since the record indi-
cated that his only sale was of heroin supplied by
an informer employed by the state, so that the
state had in reality provided the sine qua non of the
offense; and that where facts dearly suggesting
entrapment have been presented at the trial, the
defense of entrapment can be raised on appeal,
although it was not specially pleaded below.
Habeas .Corpus-Rogers v. Richmond, 81 Sup.
Ct. 735 (1961). See Confessions, supra.
Insanity--Ozerlolser v. Lynch. 288 F.2d 388
(D.C. Cir. 1961). The District Court granted de-
fendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
order his release from a mental hospital to which
he had been committed after being acquitted, by
reason of insanity, of bad check charges, unless he
were duly committed in a civil proceeding within
ten days. On appeal, the hospital contended that
on the trial of the cause, the court properly refused
to allow defendant to plead guilty; and that
District of Columbia statutes authorizing a judge
in a criminal case to commit a defendant to a
mental hospital on certification of insanity by the
superintendent, or on acquittal by reason of in-
sanity, but not requiring civil committment pro-
cedures, were constitutional; and consequently
that defendant's committment by the trial judge
did not deprive him of any rights. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that while a trial court
must refuse to accept a plea of guilty made in-
voluntarily without understanding of the nature
of the charge, it has discretion in other cases to
refuse to accept such plea; that although after
treatment defendant was found competent to stand
trial, the superintendent's report certifying belief
that defendant's unlawful acts were the product of
a mental disease or defect presented grounds for
exercise of the court's discretion in order to permit
litigation of the issue of defendant's culpability;
that those found not guilty by reason of insanity
are to be committed for treatment rather than con-
victed for punishment; that since the statute pro-
vides that a defendant so committed shall be
released when found to be of sound mind, it is not
constitutionally necessary for committment to be
based on affirmative proof of insanity such as that
established in a civil committment proceeding;
and that consequently the district court should not
have granted the writ, since the trial court's action
was correct. Judges Fahy, Edgerton, and Bazelon
dissented, holding that the district court was cor-
rect in deciding to grant the writ unless defendant
were committed in a civil proceeding, since affirma-
tii'e proof of insanity is required for committment.
Compare United States v. Naples, infra.
Insanity-United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp.
23 (D.D.C. 1961). Defendant waived his right to
a jury trial and pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity to charges of first and second degree
murder, housebreaking, and petit larceny. The trial
judge, Holtzoff, J., compared the insanity test of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(one is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of a mental disease or defect,
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
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1954)) with that of' the United States Supreme
Court (one is not criminally responsible if he is not
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong
or not aware of the nature of his act, or if he is so
aware, if his mental derangement renders him un-
able to control his actions, Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469 (1895)), and det&mined that the two
are substantively identical, although a jury has
more difficulty coping with the abstract termi-
nology of the former. Although at the trial the
Government (on basis of the Davis case) assumed
the burden of proving defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt once some evidence of his in-
sanity had been introduced, and the court decided
the case on that basis, Judge Holtzoff reasoned
that since this procedure might permit one who is
actually sane to successfully plead insanity merely
because the Government is unable to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt, and since the applica-
ble statute requires that one who is acquitted
solely because he was insane when the crime was
committed shall be confined in a mental hospital,
the burden of proof of insanity must henceforth be
borne by defendant, since Congress could not have
intended to commit to a mental hospital persons
who have not been affirmatively found insane. The
court found defendant guilty on all four counts,
recommending Executive clemency to commute
the compulsory death penalty for first degree
murder to life imprisonment, because defendant's
subnormal intelligence and personality disorder
would render capital punishment inhumane.
Interstate Transportation of False Securities-
United States v. Fordyce, 192 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.
Cal. 1961). Defendant was charged with violation
of a statute proscribing the transportation in inter-
state commerce of false securities or of anything
used in forging or altering securities, with criminal
intent. At trial without jury, defendant admitted
having transported in interstate commerce two
nation-wide credit cards knowing them to be
stolen, as well as charge slips issued on basis of the
cards. The Court found defendant not guilty, since
no "securities" were transported, holding that
where Congress does not define an ordinary term,
it is used in its ordinary dictionary sense, and that
neither the cards nor the charge slips nor the two
in combination constituted a "written instrument
evidencing an indebtedness" or conferred on de-
fendant the right to "demand and receive prop-
erty not in his possession." Compare Williams v.
United States, infra.
Interstate Transportation of False Securities-
Williams v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.
Cal. 1961). Petitioner moved to vacate judgment
of his conviction for unlawful transportation of
securities in interstate commerce, citing United
States v. Fordyce, supra, in support of his conten-
tion that a charge slip resulting from use of a
credit card is not a "security" within purview of
the statute. While the court agreed with the
Fordyce case that a credit card itself is merely an
indication of credit rating and is not a "security"
covered by the statute, it denied petitioner's mo-
tion to vacate, holding that since a charge slip
issued in reliance on a credit card is an "evidence
of indebtedness," it is a security, and petitioner's
transportation of a charge slip knowing it to have
been forged was a violation of the statute.
Larceny-Peopke v. Anderson, 10 Cal. Rptr. 64
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960). Defendants' convictions for
grand theft and attempt to commit grand theft
were based on a "confidence game" instigated in
California and culminated (in one case) in Las
Vegas, Nevada. On appeal, they contended that
California lacked jurisdiction, since no element of
either offense occurred within the state. The
District Court of Appeal found that larceny by
trick and device and obtaining property by false
pretenses were included in the theft statute, but
reversed defendants' convictions, holding that al-
though the state's penal code provides punishment
for committing a crime or part of a crime within
the state, the "part of a crime" taking place within
the state, to satisfy due process, must amount to
an attempt, for which the requisite elements are
"specific intent to commit a crime" and commis-
sion of "a direct unequivocal act [which, as op-
posed to mere preparation, sets in motion circum-
stances sufficient to culminate in commission of the
crime] toward that end"; that defendants' acts in
that state (consisting of baiting persons with
stories of a profitable gambling scheme, intended
to cause them to go to Las Vegas with defendants)
were instrumental in arranging situations whereby
the crimes could be consummated in Las Vegas,
(i.e., mere preparation), rather than actually
setting the crimes in motion without intervention
of independent circumstances (i.e., unequivocal
acts requisite for establishing attempt); and conse-
quently California lacked jurisdiction to try or
convict defendants.
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Loitering-People v. Merolla, 172 N.E.2d 541
(N.Y. 1961). See Police Power, infra.
Police Power-Lee v. State Highway Comm'in.
Motor Vehicle Dep't, 358 P.2d 765 (Kan. 1961).
Plaintiff was unsuccessful in an action to compel
reinstatement of his driver's license, which had
been revoked following his refusal to submit to a
blood test for determination of alcoholic content
pursuant to his arrest for drunken driving. On ap-
peal, plaintiff contended that a Kansas statute-
providing that any person operating a motor
vehicle on a public highway in the state is deemed
to have consented to submit to a chemical test of
breath, blood, urine, or saliva to determine the
alcoholic content of his blood whenever arrested
for any offense involving a reasonable accusation
of drunken driving-is unconstitutionaL as requir-
ing one to incriminate himself and violative of due
process of law; or, alternatively, that he should
have had his choice among the four chemical tests
prescribed, since the drawing of blood is inherently
"brutal and offensive." The Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the "right" to operate a motor
vehicle on a public highway is a privilege subject
to reasonable regulation by exercise of the State's
police power in the interest of public safety; that
the statute under attack neither required plaintiff
to incriminate himself nor deprived him of due
process of law, since it granted him both an option
not to submit to the test aind a hearing on the rea-
sonableness of his failure to submit, and since a
related statute gave him the right to bring action
for reinstatement, all of which rights he duly exer-
cised; that no choice among the tests need be given,
since under medical supervision as provided by the
statute, the drawing of blood is not "brutal and
offensive"; and that tests to determine alcoholic
content of the blood are in furtherance of justice,
since they protect from charges of drunken driving
those who are not in fact intoxicated but who
either have alcohol on their breath or appear to be
intoxicated due to causes beyond their control.
Police Power-People v. Merolla, 172 N.E.2d
541 (N.Y. 1961). Defendant's conviction of loiter-
ing near waterfront facilities in violation of the
Waterfront Commission Act was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. On appeal by permission, he
contended that the statute was unconstitutional
and void because of the vagueness and ambiguity
of the terms "loitering," "without a satisfactory
explanation," and "within 500 feet." The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that while a criminal
statute prohibiting loitering per se is unconstitu-
tional for lack of distinction between harmful and
innocent conduct, one prohibiting loitering in a
specified area can be definitely and clearly con-
strued in context to prohibit only lingering about
that area for a purpose unconnected with lawful
business of the area; that the phrase "without a
satisfactory explanation" is a procedural rather
than a substantive one, and limits the scope of the
statute in favor of the accused; and that although
public streets might be encompassed by the statute,
so that the valid, restrictive construction of
"loitering" would not apply, the constitutionality
of a statute must be determined as applied to the
present facts, not to a hypothetical situation. Com-
pare People v. MHunz, infra.
Police Power-People v. Munoz, 172 N.E.2d 535
(N.Y. 1961). Defendant's conviction for violating
a section of the New York City Administrative
Code, making unlawful the possession of sharp
pointed or edged instruments by persons under 21
in public places, was affirmed by the Appellate
Part of the city's Court of Special Sessions. On
appeal by permission, defendant contended that
since the section did not clearly indicate what
persons were included or what acts prohibited, it
was unconstitutional and void. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the section was so
vague that- it could be violated by the innocent
carrying of a nail file or fountain pen; that although
it purports to create an offense which is malum
prohibitum, the section excepts from prosecution
a minor who proves he was not actuated by pur-
poses that were malum in se; and that with regard
to a crime for which no criminal intent is neces-
sary, although the legislature determines how the
police power should be exercised, the courts must
determine whether there is a reasonable relation
between the statute which makes criminal an
otherwise innocent act and the object sought to be
attained. Two judges dissented, holding that the
section is not unconstitutionally vague because it
contains specific exceptions, and that it should be
sustained as a necessary means of dealing with a
desperate situation.
Receiving Stolen Goods-Milanovich v. United
States, 81 Sup. Ct. 728 (1961). Convictions of
defendants, a husband and wife, for stealing
United States property, and that of the wife for
receiving such property, were affirmed by the Court
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of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On certiorari,
the husband contended that the trial court's cau-
tionary instructions to Government witnesses were
erroneous; and the wife contended that the court
erred in not instructing that she could be found
guilty either of stealing or receiving the goods, but
not both. The Supreme Court, finding no merit in
the husband's contention, affirmed his conviction,
but reversed and remanded as to the wife, holding
that one cannot be convicted of receiving from
himself; that although defendant was a principal
to the larceny by statutory definition rather than
by being an active participant, she could not be
found guilty of both offenses, since Congress, by
providing punishment both for stealing and receiv-
ing, intended to reach a new group of offenders;
and that defendant wife was entitled to have a new
trial on both counts, rather than to have the trial
judge set aside sentence on either, since it was im-
possible to say what verdict might have been re-
turned had the jury been properly instructed.
Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and
Whittaker dissented as to the wife, holding that
while an individual cannot be found guilty of both
stealing and receiving where the two offenses are
component parts of a single, merged transaction,
defendant perpetrated the offenses in two clearly
separable transactions; and that even if defendant
could be found guilty in law of only one of the two
counts, remanding the case for resentencing by the
trial judge, rather than for a new trial, would have -
been sufficient since the evidence supported ver-
dicts of guilty on both counts.
Right to Counsel-Ferguson v. Georgia, 81 Sup.
Ct. 756 (1961). Defendant's conviction for murder
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. On
appeal, he contended that a Georgia statute per-
mitting defendants to make unsworn statements
without assistance of counsel, in context with a
statute making defendants incompetent to testify
on their own behalf, violated the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While not passing
on the constitutionality of the incompetency
statute (the sole persisting codification of a once
universal common-law rule), the harshness of
which the unsworn statement statute was de-
signed to ameliorate, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that de-
fendant's right to be heard by counsel, applicable
in state courts through the due process clause, had
been denied by Georgia when his counsel was not
permitted to question him in order to elicit his un-
sworn statement. Justices Frankfurter and Clark
concurred in the result, stating that their decision
was based not on the unconstitutionality of the
unsworn statement statute, but on that of the in-
competency statute which, in their opinion, vio-
lated due process.
Right to Counsel-McNeal v. Culver, 81 Sup. Ct.
413 (1961). After petitioner was convicted of as-
sault to murder in the second degree, the Supreme
Court of Florida denied his habeas corpus petition
without a hearing and remanded petitioner to
custody. On certiorari, he contended that since his
petition alleged facts and circumstances which,
when considered together with the record, rendered
his trial fundamentally unfair, the Florida Supreme
Court should have granted him a hearing. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
holding that although Florida law requires ap-
pointment of counsel only in capital cases, due
process of law required the court to provide peti-
tioner with counsel, since in light of his inability
to effectively conduct his defense, denial of counsel
rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, if the
facts concerning petitioner's lack of education,
mental illness, and unfamiliarity with court pro-
cedure as alleged in his petition are true; and that
petitioner was entitled to a hearing by the Florida
Supreme Court to determine the truth of his allega-
tions. Justices Brennan and Douglas concurred,
agreeing that if his allegations were true, peti-
tioner's trial was not fundamentally fair, but
stating in addition that the rule requiring a state
court to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant
in a criminal case only where denial of counsel
would result in a trial lacking "fundamental fair-
ness" (Belts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)) is itself
unfair, since it permits rich men to have counsel
in any case, while indigent ones are granted coun-
sel only if the requirements of the rule are met.
Search and Seizure-Silverman v. United States,
81 Sup. Ct. 679 (1961). Defendants' convictions for
gambling offenses were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. On certio-
rari, they contended that the trial court erred in
admitting testimony of officers concerning what
they had heard by means of a "spike mike," since
use of this listening device violated defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that since use of the "spike mike"
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entailed penetration of the wall of defendants'
premises and usurpation of part of the premises
(the heating system) without their knowledge or
consent, defendants' Fourth Amendment rights
were violated, and hence testimony growing out of
the use of the device was improperly admitted.
While the majority distinguished this case from
those in which eavesdropping accomplished with-
out unauthorized physical encroachment was held
not to violate the Fourth Amendment, [e.g.,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1932)],
Justice Douglas, concurring, advocated overruling
those cases, since in his view the criterion should
be whether the privacy of the home has been in-
vaded, not whether it has been invaded by an
actual physical penetration.
Search and Seizure--Chapman v. United States,
81 Sup. Ct. 776 (1961). Defendant's conviction for
illegal operation of a distillery was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On certio-
rari, he contended that the federal district court
erred in admitting, after his motion to suppress,
evidence seized without a warrant by state officers.
The Supreme Court reversed, applying federal
standards (as had the trial court) to the conduct
of state officers under the Ejkins rule, holding that
even though probable cause existed and the search
was conducted at the request of defendant's land-
lord, there was no reason for not obtaining a war-
rant, and thus the officer's search of defendant's
leased premises *without a warrant violated his
Fourth Amendment rights; and that since the
search was unlawful, the evidence so obtained
should not have been admitted at the trial. Justice
Clark dissented, reasoning that the search was
legal inasmuch as under Georgia law, a landlord
may repossess premises being wasted [or used for
criminal purposes]; thus the defendant's lease was
forfeited when his landlord exercised that option,
and when the officers broke into the premises, they
were merely aiding the landlord to repossess.
Search and Seizure-People v. Hammond, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1960). Defendant was convicted of
possessing and selling heroin. On appeal, he con-
tended that his conviction of the possession charge
was not supported, since the only evidence thereof
wras obtained through an unlawful search. The
Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding
that although the search in question was conducted
without a warrant, without requesting permission
to enter, and prior to defendant's arrest, the cri-
terion of whether a search is lawful is its reasonable-
ness; that since the officers had reasonable cause to
believe defendant was in possession of narcotics,
that he had a gun, and was under influence of
heroin, they could have first validly arrested him
and then lawfully searched the premises for the
fruits of the crime; that although a search without
warrant prior to arrest is generally unlawful, in
light of circumstances known to them, the officers
in good faith could conclude that if they demanded
admission before breaking in, defendant might
destroy the narcotics and/or fire at them; that in
such circumstances, strict compliance with statu-
tory provisions for arrests and searches pursuant
thereto is not required; and consequently, the fact
that defendant was arrested without the formality
required by statute did not require the exclusion
of evidence seized in ensuing search, since in light
of all the circumstances, the search was rea-
sonable.
Self-Incrimination-Stewart v. United States,
81 Sup. Ct. 941 (1961). Defendant was convicted
and sentenced to death for felony murder after the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had reversed two prior convictions for the
same murder. On certiorari, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his
motion for a mistrial on the ground that the
Government, in cross-examining defendant, had
informed the jury of his failure to testify at each
of the earlier trials. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that although it is not prejudicial to allow
comment on failure to testify at a previous trial
for the purpose of impeaching specific testimony,
such comment for the purpose of impeaching de-
fendant's "demeanor-evidence," consisting of his
gibberish testimony from which insanity could
have been inferred, was prejudicial, and conse-
quently the trial court's denial of his motion for a
mistrial was reversible error, even though the
defense made no request for cautionary instruc-
tions. Justices Clark, Whittaker, Frankfurter, and
Harlan dissented, stating that the comment was
not prejudicial when viewed in light of the trial in
its entirety.
Self.Incrimination-Sandrei v. Commonwealth,
172 N.E.2d 449 (Mass. 1961). Defendant, a grand
jury witness, invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination during a homicide hearing, and was
